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"[T]he moment the child is born, the mother is also born. [She] never
existed before. The woman existed, but the mother, never. And a
mother is something absolutely new." — Osho, Indian Philosopher1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The practice of surrogate motherhood has existed since ancient
times. In the Bible, when Sarah found herself infertile, she asked her
husband, Abraham, to impregnate her slave, Hagar, so that they might
“build a family through her.”2 This was not surrogacy as we think of it
today because it involved sexual intercourse, but the idea of having a
child gestated by a woman other than the father’s wife existed even
back then. Conflict grew between Sarah and Hagar, which led
Abraham to send Hagar and the child away.3 Conflict between
intended mothers and surrogates4 still happens today,5 and, when it
does, the results can be disastrous.
What would you do if someone took your child? Imagine that
you entered into a surrogacy contract with a woman to have her
inseminated with your own, your partner’s, or a donor’s sperm. The
contract stated that the resulting child would be yours, and she would
merely be carrying the child for you as a surrogate. You waited with
excitement for this child. You picked out his or her name, decorated
his or her room, and read books on parenting. You went to the doctor
*

Frank J. Bewkes is an LL.M. candidate at the New York University School of Law.
He has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Yale University and a Juris
Doctor from The George Washington University Law School. Mr. Bewkes would
like to thank his professors, Stephanie Ridder and Karen Thornton, for shepherding
him through the writing process. He is also grateful to his parents for their
unwavering support, and he would like to dedicate this article to his mother, Susan
Frank Kelley.
1
OSHO, BE OCEANIC 9 (Ma Prem Maneesha & Swami Prem Amrito eds., 2007).
2
Genesis 16:2-4 (New International Version).
3
Genesis 21:9-14 (New International Version).
4
There is some debate about the proper terminology to use when referring to a
woman who gestates a baby for others. The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, for example, has adopted the term “gestational mother”
because it is supposedly more precise. See JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 452-53 (2d ed. 2013). “Mother” is a loaded term in
the world of assisted reproductive technology; therefore, the term “surrogate” will be
used throughout this paper to describe a woman who gestates a child for others
without intent to be the child’s mother.
5
Conflict is not common, and one estimate puts the percentage of surrogacy
arrangements that have resulted in legal disputes at a hundredth of a percent. Id. at
422 (citing Elly Teman, The Social Construction of Surrogacy Research: An
Anthropological Critique of the Psychosocial Scholarship on Surrogate Motherhood,
67 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1104 (2008)).
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appointments and saw the sonograms. You already love this child.
And yet, when the time came to surrender the child, the surrogate
changed her mind. She claimed that she could not and would not give
up the baby. She fled the state, or perhaps the country. She called
herself the child’s mother. Such is the danger of surrogacy. And yet,
the practice continues.
This paper addresses the fact that traditional surrogates are
considered mothers of the children they carry in almost every state.
Traditional surrogacy is not often addressed in current scholarship
because it is disfavored for putting intended parents on unsteady legal
ground. The recognition of maternity in traditional surrogates
empowers them to change their minds after the birth and keep the
child, an outcome unacceptable to intended parents. Changing how
traditional surrogates are viewed would rectify the situation.
Traditional surrogates should not be seen as mothers.
Part II is an exploration into how gestational and traditional
surrogacy are treated differently, or similarly, in several states based
upon whether traditional surrogates are presumed to be mothers. Part
III discusses the fact that sperm and egg donors are almost never
considered the parents of children resulting from their donations. Part
IV discusses the concept of parenthood by intent, embracing
California’s view of surrogacy and taking it a step further. Traditional
surrogates should not have parental rights because they are simply egg
donor and gestational surrogate combined in one person. If each
separately should not give rise to motherhood, then both together
should not give rise to motherhood. Issues of autonomy and feminism
are also addressed in Part IV. Part V discusses the best interest of the
child, and why best interest is irrelevant in a surrogacy framework
embracing parenthood by intent. Finally, Part VI discusses two model
policy recommendations that come close to embodying the spirit of
motherhood by intent and prohibiting traditional surrogates from
changing their minds.
There are two types of surrogacy agreements, each defined by
whether or not the surrogate is the egg donor.6 In traditional
surrogacy, the surrogate is artificially inseminated with the semen of
the intended father or a donor, which combines with her own egg to
form an embryo.7 The traditional surrogate is, therefore, also the
genetic mother of the resulting child.8 Meanwhile, in gestational
6

CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 152 (2d ed.
2011).
7
Id. at 152-53.
8
Id.
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surrogacy, in vitro fertilization is used.9 The egg of a donor, or of the
intended mother, is fertilized with sperm outside of the womb and the
resulting embryo is implanted in a gestational surrogate.10 Thus, a
gestational surrogate has no genetic connection to the child she
carries.11
In re Baby M was the first case to address the issue of
surrogacy, and it presented facts much like the nightmare scenario
previously mentioned.12 William and Elizabeth Stern wanted a child,
but Mrs. Stern had a condition that made pregnancy risky.13 They
entered into a traditional surrogacy contract with Mary Beth
Whitehead, and Mrs. Whitehead was artificially inseminated with Mr.
Stern’s sperm.14 The arrangement progressed smoothly at first, as
most do.15 Mrs. Whitehead wanted to give the Sterns the “gift of
life.”16 Unfortunately, “Mrs. Whitehead realized, almost from the
moment of birth, that she could not part with [Baby M],”17 and she
fled the state, leading to a now-famous court battle over custody of the
child.18 Though the Sterns were ultimately granted custody, the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated that Mrs. Whitehead was the “natural
mother” of Baby M.19 Therefore, any contract where she irrevocably
surrendered her rights to the child prior to birth was unenforceable
because the law allowed for only voluntary post-birth surrender and
subsequent adoption.20
Twenty-five years later, views have changed little with regard
to traditional surrogates like Mary Beth Whitehead and their status as
legal mothers. In the wake of In re Baby M, several states moved to

9

Id.
Id. at 91.
11
Id. at 153.
12
See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
13
Id. at 1235.
14
Id.
15
See Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M,
30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 94 (2007) (“[O]nly a handful of the hundreds of
traditional surrogacy agreements brokered in the United States since Noel Keane
wrote the first some thirty years ago have resulted in litigation.”); see also Elizabeth
S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 109, 138 (2009) (citing Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating
Rough Waters: An Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC.
ISSUES 21, 31-32 (2005)) (“[F]ew surrogates report reluctance to relinquish the child,
and a very small percentage express regret about having served in the role.”).
16
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1236.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 1237.
19
Id. at 1240.
20
Id.
10
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regulate, ban, and, in a few cases, even criminalize surrogacy.21
Today, there are still many states that lack clear statutes or case law
regarding surrogacy, particularly traditional surrogacy.22 Despite this,
there is a strong trend towards recognizing traditional surrogates as
mothers of the children they bear.23 For intended parents this is,
understandably, a cause for concern.
The first traditional surrogacy contract was written by Noel
Keane, “the undisputed father of surrogate motherhood,”24 in 1976.25
It was not until 1980, however, that the first traditional surrogacy was
carried out.26 Gestational surrogacy came later in 1985 as in vitro
fertilization technology improved.27 It would be several years before
gestational surrogacy really caught on.28 Today, gestational surrogacy
is the more popular option of the two, with an estimated ninety-five
percent of surrogacy agreements involving gestational surrogacy.29 In
fact, “thirty percent of surrogacy agencies in the U.S. now offer only
gestational surrogacy.”30 This is unsurprising given that traditional
surrogacy agreements are likely unenforceable because courts are
unwilling to force surrogates to give up their biological children.31
21

Andrew H. Malcolm, Steps to Control Surrogate Births Rekindle Debate, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/26/us/steps-to-controlsurrogate-births-rekindle-debate.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
22
Diane S. Hinson, State-by-State Surrogacy Law: Actual Practices, 34 FAM.
ADVOC. 36 (2011).
23
See discussion infra Part II.
24
Sanger, supra note 15, at 83 (citing James S. Kunen, Childless Couples Seeking
Surrogate Mothers Call Michigan Lawyer Noel Keane--He Delivers, TIME, Mar. 30,
1987, at 93).
25
Lawrence van Gelder, Noel Keane, 58, Lawyer in Surrogate Mother Cases, is
Dead,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
28,
1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/28/nyregion/noel-keane-58-lawyer-in-surrogatemother-cases-is-dead.html.
26
See The History of Surrogacy, MOD. FAM. SURROGACY CENTER,
http://www.modernfamilysurrogacy.com/page/surrogacy_history (last visited Dec.
30, 2014) (discussing a basic history of surrogacy in America).
27
Id.; see also Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy Across America, 34
FAM. ADVOC. 32, 32-33 (2011).
28
See Sanger, supra note 15, at 79 (citing Direct Testimony of William Stern (Jan. 5,
1987), in 1 BABY M CASE: THE COMPLETE TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS 82-83 (1988)) (“[A]t
that time nobody in this country was doing it, it was strictly experimental.”).
29
Hinson & McBrien, supra note 27, at 32-33. See also Sanger, supra note 15, at 79
(citing Fact Sheet 56: Surrogacy (Gestational Carrier), RESOLVE: THE NAT’L
INFERTILITY
ASS’N,
2
(2004),
http://www.resolve.org/family-buildingoptions/surrogacy/.).
30
Sanger, supra note 15, at 79 n.56 (citing Mhairi Galbraith et al., Commercial
Agencies and Surrogate Motherhood: A Transaction Cost Approach, 26 HEALTH
CARE ANALYSIS 11 (2005)).
31
KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 6, at 153.
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Surrogacy is important because it is the only way for many
individuals to produce offspring to whom they are genetically related.
With surrogacy, at least one of the intended parents is able to have a
genetic link to the child.32 Many people desire this link.33 As John
Hill put it, “while adoption may satisfy one's desire to provide
nurturance for a child, adoption cannot satisfy the yearning to create
the child and to watch as a version of oneself unfolds and develops.”34
One could feasibly accomplish this with either gestational or
traditional surrogacy, but the high costs of in vitro fertilization place
gestational surrogacy out of reach for many individuals.35 Thus, for
low income individuals, traditional surrogacy may be the only way to
have a genetic link to their child.
The problem with traditional surrogacy is that, in most states,
the traditional surrogate is presumed to be the mother of the child she
carries, either because she birthed the child or because of the
confluence of gestation and genetics.36 Thus, the arrangement is
treated as a post-birth adoption, leaving the surrogate free to change
her mind after the birth.37 This would not be an issue, however, if
traditional surrogates were not presumed to be the mothers of the
children they carry.
The moral issues of surrogacy are unquestionable, but they are
not the concern here. The concern here is with motherhood. The fact
of an occurrence or status is, or at least should be, unaffected by its
morality. Becoming a mother is a fact, regardless of whether it is
through surrogacy or not. This paper tries to redefine the current

32

There are some cases of gestational surrogacy where neither intended parent is
genetically related to the child. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr.
2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). One could also imagine a traditional surrogacy
scenario where donor sperm is used.
33
See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 389-90 (1991)
(discussing the desire to have a genetic connection to one’s child and why so many
choose assisted reproductive technology over adoption).
34
Id. at 389.
35
See The “Surrogacy Parenting Agreement Act of 2013”: Hearing on Bill 20-32
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary & Pub. Safety (2013) (statement of Nancy
Polikoff, Professor, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law), available at
http://lims.dccouncil.us/_layouts/15/uploader/Download.aspx?legislationid=29188&f
ilename=B20-0032-HearingRecord1.pdf (“Gestational surrogacy, whose costs easily
exceed $100,000, is limited to the richest among us.”); see also Kristen Fischer,
Little Miracles Can Cost Big: The Economics of In-Vitro Fertilization, HEALTHLINE
NEWS (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.healthline.com/health-news/women-the-highcost-of-in-vitro-fertilization-101613.
36
Hill, supra note 33, at 372.
37
See discussion infra Part II.
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understanding of the genesis of motherhood to encompass intended
mothers who enter traditional surrogacy agreements.
II.

A SURVEY OF SURROGACY AND THE VESTING OF
“MOTHERHOOD” UPON BIRTH

In discussing the question of who is rightfully a mother of a
child born through traditional surrogacy, it is necessary to first
mention what motherhood means in a legal sense. Without this
understanding, the dispute between intended mothers and traditional
surrogates has no context. The Supreme Court of the United States
summarized the importance of parental rights in Stanley v. Illinois:
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of
the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's
children have been deemed essential, basic civil rights
of man, and rights far more precious . . . than property
rights. It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. The
integrity of the family unit has found protection in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the Ninth Amendment.38
In short, the right of motherhood is one of the most important rights
there is.
It is also important to note that assisted reproductive
technology, such as surrogacy, occupies a fast-changing and somewhat
obscured legal area. Most surrogacy cases occur in family court, and
the records are sealed.39 As such, the law “as it is practiced” can be
entirely different than what a jurisdiction’s statutes and published case
law might suggest.40 As such, this paper will focus on statutes and
published case law to explore how different jurisdictions view

38

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
39
Hinson & McBrien, supra note 27, at 32.
40
Id. In Arizona, for example, both traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy
are prohibited by statute and unenforceable, but surrogacy is still practiced. Hinson,
supra note 22, at supp. 2; see also Surrogacy in Phoenix, AZ, FERTILITY AUTHORITY,
http://www.fertilityauthority.com/articles/surrogacy-phoenix-az (last visited Dec. 30,
2014).
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surrogates and how gestational and traditional surrogates are treated
differently. For the purposes of this analysis, we will look at three
types of jurisdictions: those that presume both types of surrogate are
mothers, those that presume only traditional surrogates are mothers,
and those that do not presume surrogates of any type are mothers.
Typing is done by looking to whether the surrogate is permitted to
change her mind and refuse to relinquish the baby after the birth. This
is based on the understanding that a mother cannot be forced to
relinquish a baby in such a way, but a non-mother can.
A. All Surrogates Are Mothers
i.

New Jersey

New Jersey was one of the first United States jurisdictions to
address surrogacy in its courts.41 As mentioned above, in the Baby M
case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the surrogacy
contract between the Sterns and the Whiteheads was invalid because it
conflicted with both the statutes and the public policies of the state.42
The court’s decision spells out the arguments against traditional
surrogacy, mainly that a traditional surrogate is a mother.43 The
statutory reasons given for finding the contract unenforceable were
that the compensation aspect made it comparable to baby-selling, the
proper procedure for termination of parental rights had not been
followed, and “surrender of custody and consent to adoption” is
“revocable in private placement adoptions.”44 All three of these
reasons are only issues if the traditional surrogate is considered a
mother.
Indeed, the court refers to Mary Beth Whitehead as the “natural
mother” of Baby M throughout the opinion.45 Under New Jersey law,
“[t]he natural mother, may be established by proof of her having given
birth to the child.”46 Presumably, this statute originates from the legal
principle of mater semper certa est, or “the mother is always certain,”
meaning that whoever gives birth to a child is that child’s mother.47

41

Scott, supra note 15, at 112-13 n.19.
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See generally id.
46
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41 (West 2013).
47
See Mater Semper Certa Est, WORLD HERITAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.worldheritage.org/articles/Mater_semper_certa_est (last visited Dec. 30,
2014); see also GERDA A. KLEIJKAMP, FAMILY LIFE AND FAMILY INTERESTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
42
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For the vast majority of human history this was true. In fact, Aristotle
once commented that “mothers are fonder of their children than
fathers” because they are surer they are their own, having birthed
them.48 Indeed, in the Baby M case, Mary Beth Whitehead’s genetic
connection to the child was only mentioned once, so that was likely
not the basis for the court’s opinion.49
The court also took issue with the termination of Mary Beth
Whitehead’s parental rights.50 Under New Jersey law, termination of
parental rights can only occur through “an action by an approved
agency, an action by [the Division of Youth and Family Services], or
an action in connection with a private placement adoption.”51 But
none of those actions occurred.52 Because the court saw Mary Beth
Whitehead as the mother of the child, they essentially viewed the
arrangement as an adoption gone wrong.53 Of particular concern to the
court was the fact that the contract claimed to embody the best
interests of the child, the standard used in custody disputes in almost
every jurisdiction, as if parents can simply decide what those best
interests are without reference to any standard.54 Rather, the court
stated:
The surrogacy contract guarantees permanent
separation of the child from one of its natural parents.
Our policy, however, has long been that to the extent
possible, children should remain with and be brought
up by both of their natural parents . . . . The impact of
failure to follow that policy is nowhere better shown
than in the results of this surrogacy contract. A child,
instead of starting off its life with as much peace and

HUMAN RIGHTS ON DUTCH FAMILY LAW AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION ON AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 159-60 (1999) (discussing the
concept of mater semper certa est); K. ZWEIGERT & K. DROBNIG, INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 28 (1991) (discussing the same).
48
ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. IX, at 7 (W.D. Ross trans.) (c. 384
B.C.E.).
49
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248.
50
Id. at 1240.
51
Id. at 1242.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1234.
54
Id. at 1246 (“The contract's basic premise, that the natural parents can decide in
advance of birth which one is to have custody of the child, bears no relationship to
the settled law that the child's best interests shall determine custody.”).

152

Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice

[Vol. 3:2

security as possible, finds itself immediately in a tugof-war between contending mother and father.55
In other words, Baby M was being separated from the person the court
saw as her mother, which courts generally do not believe is in a child’s
best interest.56 According to the court, both Mary Beth Whitehead and
William Stern had an equal right to the child, and the surrogacy
contract by which Mary Beth disposed of her rights was, therefore,
invalid.57
Gestational surrogates have been treated the same as traditional
surrogates in New Jersey.58 In A.H.W. v. G.H.B, a heterosexual couple
combined the woman’s egg with the man’s sperm to create an embryo
that would be implanted in and gestated by the woman’s sister because
the woman was unable to carry a child.59 The couple then sought a
pre-birth order declaring themselves the legal parents of the child.60
The court denied the petition for the pre-birth declaration of parentage,
holding that the voluntary surrender of the child by the gestational
surrogate is only valid if executed seventy-two hours after birth.61 The
gestational surrogate was seen as a mother and the surrogacy
arrangement, while allowed, was treated like an adoption.62 The
gestational surrogate was treated as the mother of the child, even
though the intended mother was also the genetic mother.63
The seventy-two hour requirement was reaffirmed in A.G.R. v.
D.R.H, when a sister serving as a gestational surrogate for her brother
and his partner changed her mind and retained her maternal rights,
since their pre-birth surrender agreement was unenforceable.64 In that
case, the Court further held gestational and traditional surrogacy to be

55

Id. at 1246-47.
Hill, supra note 33, at 364 (citing Irma S. Russell, Within the Best Interests of the
Child: The Factor of Parental Status in Custody Disputes Arising from Surrogacy
Contracts, 27 J. FAM. L. 587, 622 (1989)) (“[A]ll states apply a presumption that
placement of the child with its natural parent is in the best interests of the child.”).
57
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1247.
58
New Jersey, State-by-State Surrogacy Law, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS,
http://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/state-map/new-jersey-surrogacy-laws
(last visited September 27, 2014).
59
A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
60
Id. at 950.
61
Id. at 954; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41 (West 2013).
62
A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 954.
63
Id.
64
A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, slip op. at 2-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
Dec.
23,
2009),
available
at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20091231_SURROGATE.pdf.
56
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indistinguishable, recognizing both types of surrogates as mothers
regardless of genetics.65
ii.

New Hampshire

Unlike New Jersey, New Hampshire has a statutory scheme
specifically allowing surrogacy.66 The New Hampshire statutes define
“birth mother” as “a woman who gestates an embryo conceived by
natural or artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, preembryo
transfer or as a result of a surrogacy contract.”67 In other words, both
traditional and gestational surrogates are considered mothers by virtue
of their gestation of the child.68 Meanwhile, “surrogate” is defined as
“a woman who agrees, pursuant to a surrogacy contract, to bear a child
for intended parents.”69
The New Hampshire statutes provide for the automatic transfer
of parental rights to the intended parents, provided that all the proper
procedures have been followed.70 These procedures require judicial
preauthorization of the surrogacy contract,71 and the contract must
allow the surrogate seventy-two hours in which she may change her
mind and keep the baby.72 In fact, despite the statutory scheme and
judicial preauthorization of the surrogacy contract, the intended
parents are not vested with parenthood until after the seventy-two
hours have passed at which point they may be recorded on the child’s
birth certificate.73 If extenuating circumstances exist that “prevent the
surrogate from making an informed decision” within the seventy-two
hour window, the decision window may be extended up to one week.74
iii.

Louisiana

Louisiana also presumes both types of surrogate to be mothers,
though the law is mostly silent on the issue of surrogacy.75 Only
traditional surrogacy for compensation is addressed explicitly, with all

65

Id at 5.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 (2013).
67
Id. § 168-B:1(II).
68
See also id. § 168-B:2 (“A woman is the mother of a child to whom she has given
birth, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.”).
69
Id. § 168-B:1 (XIV).
70
Id. § 168-B:4.
71
Id. § 168-B:23.
72
Id. § 168-B:25(IV).
73
Id. § 168-B:26.
74
Id. § 168-B:25(IV)(b).
75
See Hinson, supra note 22, at supp. 4.
66
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such contracts being declared void.76 In that statute, traditional
surrogacy is referred to as “surrogate motherhood.”77 Uncompensated
traditional surrogacy occurs, but is treated like an adoption, with the
traditional surrogate having the right to refuse to relinquish the child
after the birth.78 Louisiana, with few exceptions, defines motherhood
by whoever births the child.79 This is made more apparent when one
considers Louisiana’s proposed 2013 legislation, which would have
made all traditional surrogacy agreements void, regardless of whether
they were compensated or not.80 A comment on that portion of the bill
read, “A surrogacy arrangement that would allow a mother to agree to
relinquish her biological child in advance of its birth violates the
public policy of this state and is, therefore, unenforceable, whether the
contract is gratuitous or onerous.”81
Meanwhile, “Louisiana law is silent as to gestational
surrogacy agreements between non-relatives…,”82 though such
agreements do occur and, being unenforceable, are treated as
adoptions.83 The exception is when a gestational surrogacy agreement
involves a gestational surrogate “who is related by blood or affinity to
a biological parent” of the child.84 In those cases, “the biological
parents proven to be the mother and father by DNA testing shall be
considered the parents of the child.”85 This is the only exception to the
statutory rule that the woman who gives birth to a child is its mother.86
Despite this, it remains unclear what happens if custody is disputed
between the intended or biological parents and their related gestational
surrogate. Likely, the agreement would be unenforceable, and the
gestational surrogate would be allowed to change her mind.87
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LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A) (2013).
Id. § 9:2713(B) (emphasis added).
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Hinson, supra note 22, at supp. 4.
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LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184 (2013).
80
See H.R. 433, 39th Reg. Sess. (La. 2013); S.R. 162, 39th Reg. Sess. (La. 2013).
81
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184.
82
Katherine S. Spaht, Who's Your Momma, Who Are Your Daddies? Louisiana's
New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 307, 335 (2007).
83
See Hinson, supra note 22, at supp. 4.
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LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:34(B)(1)(j) (Supp. 2013). The intended parents in this
case must be a married couple and must submit both the sperm and the egg used for
the procedure, making them the genetic parents. Id. § 40:32.
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Id. § 40:34(B)(1)(j); see also id. § 40:34(B)(1)(i).
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LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184 (2013).
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See Hinson, supra note 22, at supp. 4 (stating that surrogacy contracts are not
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Florida

Florida is unique among the states in having a statutory scheme
specifically allowing traditional surrogacy.88 However, traditional
surrogates are seen as mothers.89 Not only are the surrogacy
agreements treated as adoptions, but they are explicitly called “preplanned” adoptions.90 According to Florida law,
A preplanned adoption agreement must include, but
need not be limited to, the following terms: . . . That
the volunteer mother agrees…to bear the child, and to
terminate any parental rights and responsibilities to the
child she might have through a written consent
executed at the same time as the preplanned adoption
agreement, subject to a right of rescission by the
volunteer mother any time within 48 hours after the
birth of the child, if the volunteer mother is genetically
related to the child . . . . That the intended father
and intended mother acknowledge that they may not
receive custody or the parental rights under the
agreement if the volunteer mother terminates the
agreement or if the volunteer mother rescinds her
consent to place her child for adoption within 48 hours
after the birth of the child, if the volunteer mother is
genetically related to the child.91
Even if the traditional surrogate relinquishes the child to the intended
parents, a court must still review and approve the adoption.92
Gestational surrogates in Florida are also seen as mothers,
though this is less obvious.
A gestational surrogacy contract in Florida must contain a provision
stating that the surrogate will relinquish her parental rights upon the
birth of the child.93 Although the intended parents, so long as one of
them is the genetic parent, are “presumed to be the natural parents of
the child,” they are not vested with parental rights upon the birth of the
child.94 Rather, the intended parents must file a petition for a court
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FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213 (West Supp. 2013).
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. § 63.213(2) (emphasis added).
92
Id. § 63.213(1)(a).
93
Id. § 742.15(3)(c).
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Id. § 742.16(7).
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hearing within three days of the birth, and at the hearing a judge enters
a final post-birth order declaring the child’s parentage.95 Thus, before
the order, the gestational surrogate is legally the mother.
B. Only Traditional Surrogates Are Mothers
Even states that are willing to allow gestational surrogacy, but
deny gestational surrogates parental rights in favor of the intended
parents, still see traditional surrogacy as different.96 Traditional
surrogates are seen as mothers, even when gestational surrogates are
not. Nowhere is this as clear as it is in North Dakota. In one statute,
North Dakota explicitly declares the intended parents to be the parents
of children born through gestational surrogacy arrangements.97 Then,
in another statute, North Dakota explicitly declares traditional
surrogacy agreements void, and names traditional surrogates as the
mothers of the children they carry.98 The following two examples of
California and Massachusetts further emphasize the difference that
many states see between the maternity claim of a gestational surrogate,
and the maternity claim of a traditional surrogate.
i.

California

California is extremely friendly towards gestational surrogacy
by denying gestational surrogates maternal rights.99 For example, in
Johnson v. Calvert, Mark and Crispina Calvert entered into a contract
with Anna Johnson, who agreed to gestate a child created from their
egg and sperm.100 The relationship between the two parties soured,
and Anna Johnson brought an action to have herself declared the
mother of the child she gestated.101 The court then faced the fact that
California law recognized both genetics and birth as two means of
determining motherhood.102 Ultimately the court concluded that
“when the two means [of determining motherhood] do not coincide in
one woman, she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as
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Id. § 742.16(1).
See Hinson & McBrien, supra note 27, at 33-34.
97
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-08 (2013).
98
Id. § 14-18-05.
99
See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Marriage of
Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
100
Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 782.
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her own—is the natural mother under California law.”103 When faced
with two seemingly legal mothers, the court used intent to tip the scale
in favor of the intended and genetic mother.104
The California Court of Appeals took this holding one step
further by eliminating the need for intended parents to even be
genetically related to the child.105 The case involved a dispute
between intended parents, in which one disavowed parentage and the
other claimed parentage.106 Ultimately, both intended parents were
declared parents. 107 The court reasoned that intended parents are
similarly positioned to the husband of a woman being artificially
inseminated with donor sperm: “In each instance, a child is procreated
because a medical procedure was initiated and consented to by
intended parents.”108 The lack of a genetic connection to the child was
deemed irrelevant in this case, as genetics and giving birth are cited as
only two of several ways by which parentage may be proven or
presumed.109
Despite this progressive view towards gestational surrogacy,
traditional surrogates are still considered mothers in California, and
traditional surrogacy arrangements are treated as adoptions.110
California courts first addressed the issue in In re Adoption of Matthew
B., where a traditional surrogate tried to withdraw her consent to the
adoption after the fact.111 The court noted that she had already given
her “full and free consent” to the adoption.112 The validity of the
“allegedly illegal” traditional surrogacy contract was deemed
irrelevant, since the parties followed the proper adoption
procedures,113 and the intended parents retained their status as adoptive
parents.114 Later, in In re Marriage of Moschetta, a California court
reaffirmed the notion that traditional surrogacy agreements must be
treated as adoptions, granting the traditional surrogate parental rights
because “[u]nder Family Code section 8814, an adoption statute, ‘birth
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Id.
Id.
105
See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 285.
110
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
In re Adoption of Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
111
In re Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
112
Id. at 28.
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Id. at 25 (“[Intended mother]'s adoption action relies not on the allegedly illegal
contract, but on [traditional surrogate]'s signed consent.”).
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Id. at 37.
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parents’ must specifically consent to an adoption in the presence of a
social worker. There was no such consent here.”115 When “the two
usual means of showing maternity—genetics and birth—coincide in
one woman,” as they do in traditional surrogacy, California sees the
surrogate as the mother.116
ii.

Massachusetts

Like California, traditional surrogates in Massachusetts are
seen as mothers, and traditional surrogacy is treated as adoption.117
The traditional surrogate, as the legal mother, must give consent to the
adoption, but not before four days after the birth.118 In R.R. v. M.H., a
traditional surrogate changed her mind before the birth and wished to
keep the child.119 The traditional surrogacy agreement she signed was
not enforceable because her consent to relinquish the child could not
be valid prior to four days after the birth, much less prior to birth.120
Gestational surrogacy agreements have been upheld in
Massachusetts because gestational surrogates are not seen as mothers,
but rather as “gestational carriers.”121 It is highly relevant in
Massachusetts that a gestational surrogate is not genetically related to
the child she carries.122 Intended parents who are also genetic parents
may have their rights affirmed via a pre-birth order due to “the
importance of establishing the rights and responsibilities of parents as
soon as is practically possible.”123
C. Neither Type of Surrogate Is The Mother: Arkansas?
Arkansas is arguably the most progressive state with regard to
surrogacy and maternal rights.124 In Arkansas, “a child born by means
of artificial insemination to a woman who is married at the time of the
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In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
117
Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Mass. 2001)
(“In such an arrangement, the surrogate is both the genetic mother of the child and
the mother who carries the child through pregnancy and delivery. The child is thus,
undisputedly, ‘her’ child to be surrendered for adoption.”).
118
R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 210, § 2 (West 2013).
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R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 793.
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Id. at 796.
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Culliton, 756 N.E.2d at 1135.
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See generally id. (mentioning “genetic” seventeen times throughout the opinion).
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Id. at 1139.
124
Terrence T. Griffin, Surrogacy Agreements: Permitting Americans to Structure
Work and Home, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1063, 1070-71 (2007).
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birth of the child shall be presumed to be the child of the woman
giving birth and the woman's husband except in the case of a surrogate
mother.”125 In the case of a surrogate mother,
[T]he child shall be that of: (1) The biological father
and the woman intended to be the mother if the
biological father is married; (2) The biological father
only if unmarried; or (3) The woman intended to be the
mother in cases of a surrogate mother when an
anonymous donor's sperm was utilized for artificial
insemination.126
At first glance, it seems that, in Arkansas, traditional surrogates
are not presumed to be the mothers of the children they carry.
However, this is tempered by the fact that in surrogacy cases, the
woman giving birth is still “presumed to be the natural mother and
shall be listed as such on the certificate of birth,” though a new birth
certificate may be issued upon a court order declaring the intended
parents the legal parents of the child.127
The Arkansas Supreme Court has treated a traditional
surrogacy arrangement like an adoption at least once before in In re
Adoption of K.F.H.128 In that case, however, a Michigan court had
already declared the surrogacy contract void under Michigan law and
gave physical custody to the genetic and intended father.129 The
dispute in that case was about adoption by the intended mother against
the will of the traditional surrogate.130 The adoption was ultimately
upheld because the traditional surrogate had not been in contact with
the children for a year and a half.131 If the children in that case had
been born in Arkansas, one wonders if adoption by the intended
mother would have even been necessary, given the statutory
presumptions in her favor. However, the fact remains that the
traditional surrogate is still seen as the default mother.132 Whether a
pre-birth court order in favor of the intended parents could negate this
(or even be granted) is an open question, though pre-birth orders for
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ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
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Id.
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See In re Adoption of K.F.H., 844 S.W.2d 343 (Ark. 1993).
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Id. at 344.
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Id. at 345-46.
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gestational surrogacy are routinely granted in Arkansas.133 Thus, even
in the state where statutes are seemingly most welcoming to traditional
surrogacy, there is ambiguity allowing for maternal rights to vest in
traditional surrogates.
III.

EGG DONORS ARE NOT PARENTS

A traditional surrogate is essentially an egg donor and a
gestational surrogate combined in one woman.134 The traditional
surrogate, like a donor, intends at the outset of the agreement to
“donate” her ova for use by other intended parents.135 So from where
do the traditional surrogate’s maternal rights, recognized to varying
degrees by essentially all fifty states, supposedly arise? Certainly they
do not arise from her mere genetic connection, nor should they. A
donor shares approximately the same amount of genetic material with
any resulting child as would a full sibling of that child.136 As one
scholar put it, “[I]f genetic similarity alone were sufficient for
ascribing parental rights, an identical twin would possess a greater
claim than the parent.”137 Genetic material, being a part of us, belongs
to us, but this ownership does not extend to resulting children because
“children are not property.”138 Additionally, a donor has presumably
given up his or her ownership of his or her donated sperm or eggs prior
to conception, so the ownership has already transferred prior to in vitro
fertilization.139
Many state legislatures have agreed that donors are not parents
of children produced from their donated sperm or eggs. As of this
writing, Alabama, Delaware, Florida, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming

133

Arkansas, State-by-State Surrogacy Law, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS,
http://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/state-map/arkansas-surrogacy-laws (last
visited September 27, 2014); see also Hinson, supra note 22, at supp. 2.
134
KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 6, at 152.
135
But see R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Mass. 1998) (“[S]urrogate
motherhood is never anonymous and her commitment and contribution is
unavoidably much greater than that of a sperm donor.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, The
Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies and the Concept of Parenthood, 39
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 117 (1998) (“[T]he surrogate is different—not because
she gestates the egg, which by itself gives her no rights, but because the egg never
leaves her body. The legal effect of a surrogacy contract thus turns on the
alienability of property within the body.”).
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Hill, supra note 33, at 391.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 392.
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explicitly clarify that egg donors are not the parents of children
conceived using their donated eggs.140 Most of these states derive
their language directly from the Uniform Parentage Act of 2002,
which reads that “a donor is not a parent of a child conceived by
means of assisted reproduction.”141 An additional ten states142 have
adopted some form of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act, which had
similar language, but only addressed sperm donors.143 A few other
states have also adopted their own sperm donor non-parentage
statutes144 without adopting the full Uniform Parentage Act.145 The
Uniform Probate Code, adopted by almost forty percent of states,146
also excludes donors from parenthood, though it is only meant to apply
to issues of inheritance.147 Most recently, the American Bar
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See ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-702 (West
2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-702
(West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-20-60 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 555 (West 2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (West 2013); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-15-702 (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(3) (West
2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.705 (West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2902 (West 2013).
141
UNIFORM
PARENTAGE
ACT
§
702
(2002),
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf; see also id.
§ 702 cmt. (“[T]his section shields all donors, whether of sperm or eggs, from
parenthood in all situations in which either a married woman or a single woman
conceives a child through [assisted reproductive technology] with the intent to be the
child’s parent, either by herself or with a man . . . .”).
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Sheet:
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(1973),
UNIFORM
LAW
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act%20
(last visited Dec. 15, 2013).
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UNIFORM
PARENTAGE
ACT
§5(b)
(1973),
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa73.pdf (“The donor of semen
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married
woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural
father of a child thereby conceived.”).
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“Donor non-parentage statute” is used here to refer to any statute that both refers
to the parental status of a donor in relation to children born from his or her gametes
and specifically excludes said donor from being the legal parent of such children.
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See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West 2013).
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Legislative Fact Sheet: Probate Code, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last
visited Dec. 15, 2013).
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2-120(b)
(2010),
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Association adopted the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology, which similarly excludes donors from parenthood.148
Generally, where “[t]he language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous,” courts will not grant parental rights to sperm or egg
donors.149 Courts even seem willing to enforce donor non-parentage
statutes in situations where the letter of the law was not followed. In
one case, the Supreme Court of Kansas construed the donor nonparentage statute somewhat loosely, glossing over a requirement that
sperm be provided to a licensed physician, saying it was mere
semantics.150 It seems that drawing clear lines for how a sperm or egg
donation is supposed to occur is less important than upholding donor
non-parentage statutes that give certainty to parents using artificial
reproductive technology to conceive.151
This interest in not “disturb[ing] the lives of the many
expectant parties to anonymous, institutional sperm donation” was
made explicit by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Ferguson v.
McKiernan.152 The court in that case upheld a verbal agreement
between a sperm donor and an intended mother who relieved him of
child support duties in exchange for him not seeking parental rights.153
The agreement and the parties’ initial adherence to it was deemed
almost indistinguishable from “institutional sperm donation,” with the
court noting “a growing consensus that clinical, institutional sperm
donation neither imposes obligations nor confers privileges upon the
sperm donor.”154

148

ABA. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY § 602
(2008), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf
(“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”).
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In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1042 (Kan. 2007); see also Steven S. v. Deborah
D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“The statute does not make an
exception for known sperm donors, who will be denied a paternity claim so long as
the semen was provided to a licensed physician for insemination of an unmarried
woman.”); In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 36 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that pursuant
to the statute a sperm donor does not have standing to pursue an action to establish
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See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1042 (holding that the relevant donor non-parentage
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to a licensed physician).
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But see Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
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was not provided to a licensed physician). Despite the strict interpretation of the
statute, the court in Jhordan C. acknowledged a clear public policy interest in not
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152
Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1247 (Pa. 2007).
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Id. at 1245-46.
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Occasionally, courts will grant parental rights to sperm and egg
donors in unusual cases, such as when the egg donor is the lesbian
partner of the intended mother. In K.M. v. E.G., for example, the egg
donor signed forms that ostensibly waived her rights to any resulting
children.155 The egg donor contended, however, that she only agreed
to donate her eggs because she understood that the couple would be
raising the resulting children together, something the intended mother
disputed.156 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of California held that:
A woman who supplies ova to be used to impregnate
her lesbian partner, with the understanding that the
resulting child will be raised in their joint home, cannot
waive her responsibility to support that child. Nor can
such a purported waiver effectively cause that woman
to relinquish her parental rights.157
Essentially, the majority made an exception to the statutory rule of
donor non-parentage for donor arrangements between lesbian
couples.158 As one dissenter points out, the majority ignores the initial
intent of the parties, calling into question all donor agreements.159 The
majority limits the ability of lesbian partners “to create, before
conception, settled and enforceable expectations about who would and
would not become parents.”160
The Supreme Court of Florida recently held similarly in
another case involving a lesbian couple. In D.M.T. v. T.M.H., the
court held that enforcement of the donor non-parentage statute in that
case would unconstitutionally infringe upon the donor’s right to
maintain a parent relationship with a child for whom she had already
assumed full parental responsibilities until the custody dispute
arose.161 The court analogized to a situation where an unmarried man
impregnates an unmarried woman.162 Though the man in such a case
“does not automatically have a fundamental right to be a parent to the
child, his right to be a parent develops substantial constitutional
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protection as a fundamental right if he assumes responsibility for the
care and raising of that child.”163 It was not the donor’s genetic
connection to the child that made her a parent, rather her genetic
connection merely gave her the opportunity to assume a parental
role.164 The Supreme Court of Virginia applied a similar logic in L.F.
v. Breit, ruling that donors cannot claim parentage through genetics
alone, but may do so when they formally acknowledge their paternity
or maternity and assume parental responsibilities for the child.165
IV.

PARENTHOOD BY INTENT

If the cases of K.M. v. E.G., D.M.T. v. T.M.H., and L.F. v. Breit
teach us anything, it is that parenthood is based on action and intent
rather than biology.166 One of the earliest cases in which a court
entertained the idea of parenthood by intent was in 1968, when the
Supreme Court of California held in People v. Sorenson that the
husband’s consent to his wife’s artificial insemination with a donor’s
sperm made him a parent.167 As the court said, it was “safe to assume
that without [the husband]'s active participation and consent the child
would not have been procreated.”168 The concept of parenthood by
intent was not really expanded beyond egg and sperm donations,
however, for many years.
Legal scholar, Marjorie Shultz, was one of the first to argue for
its application to surrogacy.169 Drawing on John Stuart Mill and
Immanuel Kant, Shultz stressed the importance of autonomy and
respect for the life choices of private parties.170 She argued that
contractual agreements of surrogacy should be upheld because doing
otherwise “denies the need for diversity and individual choice in the
most intimate areas of life, and imposes the standardized conventional
morality of particular groups and classes in the name of ‘privacy.’”171
She also noted that “biological connection will not guarantee love or
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adequate care,” whereas children “conceived and born because their
parents chose to bring them into being . . . will start life with parents
who wanted and prepared for their advent.”172 Such children owe their
existence to their “progenitors' individual intentions, their reciprocal
decisions, and their behavior and expectations in the wake of such
decisions.”173 Furthermore, but for the intent-driven actions of the
intended parents, other parties, e.g. gamete donors and/or surrogates,
would not be involved.174 Based on these principles, traditional
surrogates should not be given maternal rights.
Recognizing intended parents as the parents of children at birth
could eliminate all of the policy issues and moral conundrums
presented by traditional surrogacy. As John Hill wrote:
If the intended parents are recognized as the parents of
the child, then it is difficult to see how they could be
guilty of buying their own baby. Similarly, if the
surrogate is deemed not to be the mother of the child,
she cannot, as a logical matter, be culpable for babyselling.175
Most important, perhaps, is that if intended parents are the parents of
their child at the moment of that child’s birth, then there is no need for
adoption, and the possibility of the traditional surrogate changing her
mind is eliminated. It is time for intent to matter.176 While seemingly
parentless under this system, unintended children would be the
children of their genetic parents by default.177 Intent could simply be
used to trump the interests of other parties such as a traditional
surrogate.
A. California and Beyond
The California Supreme Court has already embraced
parenthood by intent, though they have not yet extended this reasoning
to preclude traditional surrogates from being parents.178 The court in
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Johnson v. Calvert stressed the importance of “[t]he mental concept of
the child” and giving “credit” to the “initiating parents” as
“conceivers” of the concept.179 Such a concept “creates expectations
in the initiating parents of a child, and it creates expectations in society
for adequate performance on the part of the initiators as parents of the
child.”180 The court also made a point that the entire surrogacy
process was initiated by, organized by, and would not have happened
but for the intending parents.181 The key to intended parenthood is that
the intended parents are the instigators. According to In re Buzzanca,
this concept can be used to determine the parents of a child in any
situation where the child would not exist were it not for the actions of
his or her intended parents.182 Intent can be the deciding factor in such
cases, even when the intended mother neither gestates nor has a
genetic link to the child.183
States that treat the two types of surrogacy differently184 are
inherently inconsistent. As already discussed, genetic contribution is
not enough to give rise to parentage.185 Noting that, Nancy Polikoff
pointed out that the only factor left to give a traditional surrogate a
claim to parentage is gestation.186 However, recognizing such a claim
undermines gestational surrogacy, which often denies the parentage
claims of gestational surrogates.187 Taken a step further, gestation
should not be a relevant factor in determining parentage in surrogacy
cases.
A claim to parentage based on gestation arises from alleged
physical and emotional ties to the child carried. There is some
argument to be made that whoever gestates the child should be its
mother because of an alleged bond formed in the womb.188 The
existence of a bond between gestating women and the babies they
179

Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (citing Andrea E. Stumpf,
Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE
L.J. 187, 196 (1986)).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 782; see also Hill, supra note 33, at 356 n.12 (“(1) [T]he intended parents
must plan to have a child before the conception of the child; (2) they must take
morally permissible measures, not limited to biological procreation, to bring a child
into the world; and (3) they must meet certain minimally adequate conditions to be
able to raise and care for the child.”).
182
In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291.
183
Id. at 290.
184
See discussion supra Part II.B.
185
See discussion supra Part III.
186
See Polikoff, supra note 35.
187
Id.; see also discussion supra Parts II.B-C.
188
Hill, supra note 33, at 397 (“[W]omen often report feelings of loyalty toward the
fetus early in pregnancy, sometimes as early as the end of the first trimester.”).
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carry is far from universal, however, as one study revealed that “[o]nly
41% first felt love [for their babies] during pregnancy.”189
Furthermore, the degree to which a surrogate, of any type, bonds with
the child she carries may be a function of the expectations of the
surrogate, and knowing that she has no claim to parenthood could
“mitigate” feelings of attachment.190
The physical connection
argument is perhaps more concrete, as actions of the surrogate during
gestation can have lasting effects on the child she carries.191 One court
mentioned the crucial role that a gestating woman’s endocrine system
plays in the development of the child she carries.192 However, as this
is a normal part of gestation, this could be seen as simply part of a
surrogate’s job. She is just doing what she agreed to do.
B. Autonomous Decisions
Currently, a traditional surrogate may change her mind and
keep the child she carried in all states.193 This is because traditional
surrogacy agreements are treated as adoptions.194 But traditional
surrogates should not be treated as mothers. A traditional surrogate
should not be able to give up for adoption a child that is not hers.
More importantly, the agreement that the traditional surrogate and the
intended parents entered into should be honored. This is true for three
reasons: deontological, consequential, and feminist. First, “people
generally should be held to their promises simply because promisekeeping is a good in itself.”195 Second, intended parents rely on the
surrogate to keep her promise.196 Third, not allowing a woman to
voluntarily agree to give up her child irrevocably before its birth

189

Id. at 398 (citing J.H. Kennell & M.H. Klaus, Mother-Infant Bonding: Weighing
the Evidence, 4 DEV. REV. 275, 281 (1984)).
190
Id. at 398-99; see also id. at 398 (stating that studies have shown that expectations
shape how a woman feels towards a child she carries).
191
Fetal alcohol syndrome, for example, can occur when a woman drinks alcohol
while she is pregnant.
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Causes, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/fetal-alcoholsyndrome/DS00184/DSECTION=causes (last visited Dec. 15, 2013).
192
A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
193
See generally discussion supra Part II.
194
See generally discussion supra Part II.
195
Hill, supra note 33, at 415.
196
Id. at 416.
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implies a lack of belief in her ability to make such decisions.197 As
one scholar put it:
[I]f a surrogate is released from her agreement because
she could not assess what her emotions would be at the
end of the pregnancy, how can any person be held to
any agreement when their emotions may change over
time? What does this rationale for validating breach of
the surrogacy agreement say about women's capabilities
and trustworthiness?198
Allowing surrogates to change their minds after birth “reinforces
stereotypes of women as unstable, as unable to make decisions and
stick to them, and as necessarily vulnerable to their hormones and
emotions.”199 As Margaret Sanger said, “No woman can call herself
free until she can choose consciously whether she will or will not be a
mother.”200 We must respect the ability of traditional surrogates to
irrevocably relinquish parental claims on the child they carry before
the child’s birth.
V.

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

No discussion of who should be a parent can be complete
without at least mentioning the best interests of the child. In all fifty
states, courts decide custody disputes between parents based on their
assessment of the best interests of the child.201 However, such custody
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Cf. Shultz, supra note 169, at 384 (“[Allowing] revocability expresses the idea
that the biological experience of motherhood necessarily ‘trumps’ all other
considerations.”).
198
Jessica H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion of
Female Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717 (2003); see
also Nicole Miller Healy, Beyond Surrogacy: Gestational Parenting Agreements
Under California Law, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 110 (1991) (“[I]f each individual
woman is a mature, free moral agent, then she is capable of making this decision
based on the circumstances of her own life . . . .”).
199
Shultz, supra note 169, at 384.
200
Margaret Sanger, A Parents' Problem or Woman's?, 3 BIRTH CONTROL REV. 3, 6
(1919), available at http://birthcontrolreview.net/Birth%20Control%20Review/191903%20March.pdf.
201
See generally Child Welfare Information Gateway: Determining the Best Interests
of the Child, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2012), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_interest.cfm
(last visited Dec. 14, 2013); Child Custody, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS, 0080
SURVEYS 3 (West 2007).
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disputes only affect parental rights after the birth of the child, and they
have no effect on parentage at birth.
In Illinois, for example, “there is a rebuttable presumption that
a parent is unfit” if her second newborn’s “blood, urine, or meconium”
contains traces of controlled substances at birth when this is that
parent’s second child with such results.202 In such cases, the woman
who gave birth to the child may have her parental rights terminated,203
and custody will be decided based on the child’s best interests.204
Such a ruling, however, does not change the fact that, at the time of the
child’s birth, that woman was the child’s mother.205 Intended parents,
rather than traditional surrogates, should be automatically recognized
as legal parents upon the birth of their child in a similar way. As such,
a custody ruling on best interests should have no bearing on whether
the intended parents are the original parents of the child.206
Even if the best interests of a child are relevant in determining
parentage of children born as a result of surrogacy agreements, the best
interests are served. As one court put it, it is in a child’s best interest
to have established legal parents upon his or her birth because:
Delays in establishing parentage may, among other
consequences, interfere with a child's medical treatment
in the event of medical complications arising during or
shortly after birth; may hinder or deprive a child of
inheriting from his legal parents should a legal parent
die intestate before a postbirth action could determine
parentage; may hinder or deprive a child from
collecting Social Security benefits . . . ; and may result
in undesirable support obligations as well as custody
disputes.207
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750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(k) (West 2013); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/2-3(1)(c) (West 2013).
203
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-23 (West 2013).
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As defined by ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 315.30 (2013).
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750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/4 (West 2013); cf. Shultz, supra note 169, at 341 (“Even
under conventional legal rules, children do not get a say in who their parents will be,
or for that matter, in whether they will be conceived or born.”).
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Of course, if the intended parents abuse or neglect their child, they could have
their parental rights terminated later, just as any parent could. See, e.g., 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/2-22 (West 2013).
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Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (Mass.
2001); cf. Hill, supra note 33, at 414 (mentioning “important policy considerations in
assuring the identity of the parents of the child from the time of conception”). But cf.
id. at 364 (citing Russell, supra note 56, at 622) (“[A]ll states apply a presumption
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Despite this, as already stated, best interests should not apply in a
framework where intended parents simply are the legal parents upon
their child’s birth.
VI.

UNIFORM POLICY ATTEMPTS: NOT FAR ENOUGH

So what should a statute that embraces traditional surrogacy
look like? First, it needs to allow surrogacy generally. Second, it
should not recognize surrogates of any type (traditional or gestational)
as mothers of the children they carry. Finally, it should rely on intent
when determining parentage at birth in cases involving assisted
reproductive technology (e.g. surrogacy). The distinction made
between traditional and gestational surrogacy, whereby some states
recognize intended parents as parents in cases of gestational surrogacy
and not in cases of traditional surrogacy, needs to disappear. A
surrogate is a surrogate. Two promulgated model acts come close to
satisfying these criteria: Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act of
2002,208 and Article 7 of the American Bar Association Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology of 2008.209
A. Uniform Parentage Act
Under the Uniform Parentage Act, “‘[g]estational mother’
means an adult woman who gives birth to a child under a gestational
agreement.”210 This definition encompasses both traditional and
gestational surrogates. Under the Uniform Parentage Act, a surrogacy
agreement requires the surrogate to relinquish her parental rights and
bestows them instead upon the intended parents.211 Such surrogacy
agreements must be validated by a court of competent jurisdiction.212
Prior to this validation, intended parents must undergo a home study
and must be evaluated according to the same standards by which
prospective adoptive parents are evaluated.213 This is somewhat
problematic because it treats surrogacy like adoption, seemingly

that placement of the child with its natural parent is in the best interests of the
child.”).
208
See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, art. 8 (2002).
209
See ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, art. 7
(2008), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
210
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 102(11) (2002).
211
Id. § 801(a)(2)-(3).
212
Id. §§ 802-803.
213
Id. § 803(b)(2).
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involving a best interests of the child analysis.214 However, once the
agreement is validated, the surrogate may only terminate the
agreement prior to pregnancy.215
One other possibly problematic aspect of the Uniform
Parentage Act’s proposed surrogacy framework is that the intended
parents must seek a court order confirming their parentage after the
birth of their child,216 which raises a possibility that a surrogate could
change her mind and try to seek and/or enforce parental rights to the
child. However, section 807(c) implies that this order will be granted
automatically upon a showing that the surrogacy agreement was
previously validated by a court.217 While there is perhaps too much
government oversight under the Uniform Parentage Act system, it
takes steps in the right direction.
B. ABA Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology
Like the Uniform Parentage Act, the American Bar Association
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology includes
both traditional surrogates and gestational surrogates under the same
framework, calling them both “gestational carriers.”218 Alternative A
of Article 7 describes a surrogacy agreement procedure involving
judicial validation that is almost identical to that described by the
Uniform Parentage Act.219 Alternative B, however, merely involves
an administrative procedure of filing the surrogacy agreement with the
relevant state agency before or within twenty-four hours of the birth.220
Under Alternative B, the intended parents are considered the parents of
the child and vested with parental rights and responsibilities from the
moment of the child’s birth, while the surrogate is specifically
excluded from being a parent of the child.221 The only downside to
Alternative B is that it requires at least one of the intended parents to
contribute a gamete towards the creation of their child.222 As it
requires a genetic link to the child in order to recognize parentage,
Alternative B does not go far enough in recognizing intended families.
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It also raises a question of policy consistency: if the genetic connection
to the intended parents matters, why does the genetic connection to a
traditional surrogate not matter? Such an inconsistency in an area as
controversial as surrogacy could be an opening for judges to pick apart
the statute and erode the certainty that intended parents should have in
their irrevocable parental rights.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, traditional surrogates are not mothers, and they
should not be given maternal rights. If neither gestation nor genetics
alone give rise to motherhood, then combining them in one person
should not make that person a mother. It is true that genetics and
gestation combined have been the very definition of motherhood since
time immemorial, but assisted reproductive technology has changed
that. We now enter an era where babies may soon be gestated without
need of a surrogate’s uterus.223 As technology advances, however,
traditional surrogacy will remain a cheaper and less medically
complicated option. It should not be ignored. Thus, intended parents
who elect traditional surrogacy should be protected from their
surrogate changing her mind.
A traditional surrogate is different from a mother in one
important respect: intent. This intent to create the child should vest the
intended parents with parental rights upon the child’s birth. If the
traditional surrogate is never the mother, the worry of her changing her
mind is removed. Intended parents do not need consent to take a child
if the child is already theirs.
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